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I. INTRODUCTION
Distance, space, affects people as surely as it has bred keen eyesight into
pronghorn antelope. And what makes that western space and distance?
The same condition that enforces mobility on all adapted creatures, and
tolerates only small or temporary concentrations of human or other life.
Aridity.
As Wallace Stegner suggests, the effect of aridity in the American
West is not limited to the physical landscape but is reflected in the societ-
ies inhabiting that landscape. Competition for scarce water resources is an
inherent part of life west of the 100' meridian. One of the primary chal-
lenges facing western states is the equitable allocation of limited water
resources among multiple competing interests. Many western states cur-
rently are engaged in extensive water rights litigation2 in the hope that
general stream adjudications can comprehensively define all state and fed-
eral water rights to individual river systems.' As substantial landholders in
the west, Indian tribes represent a significant interest which must be con-
sidered when determining the existence and scope of water rights through-
out the region.
Most water rights in the western United States are derived from the
doctrine of prior appropriation. However, the unique legal status of Indian
nations does not fit easily within prior appropriation schemes, making
* J.D. expected 2000, University of Montana School of Law, Missoula, MT.
1. WALLACE STEGNER, THE AMERIcAN WEST AS LIViNG SPACE 27 (1987).
2. PETER W. SLY, RESERVED WATER RIGHTS SETrLEMENT MANUAL 194, app. A (1988); See
also INSTITUTE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIAN LAW, INDIAN WATER RIGHTS IV-1 to IV-10 (1984)
(noting that negotiation and legislation may also be used to secure water rights in the American
West).
3. See Thomas H. Pacheco, How Big is Big? The Scope of Water Rights Suits Under the
McCarran Amendment, 15 ECOLOGY L. Q. 627 (1988).
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definitive adjudication of Indian reserved water rights extremely problem-
atic. Indian reserved water rights are impliedly reserved by the federal
government in order to provide each Indian reservation with water re-
sources sufficient to realize the purposes for which the reservation was
created. Therefore, inherent in the definition of Indian reserved water
rights is a reservation of water for future use. The concept of reserved
water rights, which contemplates future use, is often at odds with state
systems of water appropriation, which focus on the allocation of water
rights for actual, present use of water. The incongruity of these concepts is
particularly apparent when non-Indian landowners apply to the state for
beneficial water use permits on Indian reservations.
The Montana Supreme Court dealt with precisely this problem in a
recent case, In the Matter of the Application for Beneficial Water Use
Permit Nos. 66459-76L, Ciotti; 64988-g76L, Starner; and Application for
Change of Appropriation Water Right No. G15152-S761, Pope4 (Ciotti).
The court in Ciotti held that, where the overall quantity of allocable water
was not certain, the existence of Indian reserved water rights precluded
state court adjudication of water rights on the Flathead Reservation under
the Montana Water Use Act.5 This Note focuses on the Montana Supreme
Court's strict and realistic interpretation of Indian reserved water rights in
concluding that Ciotti preserved, at least for the moment, the federal basis
of those rights in Montana.
II. INDIAN RESERVED WATER RIGHTS: FROM MCCARRAN TO
COLORADO RIVER
A. Origin of Indian Reserved Water Rights
Any discussion of Indian water rights necessarily begins with the
unique relationship between the federal government and the American
Indians. In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,6 Chief Justice Marshall wrote
that Indian tribes are "domestic dependent nations" whose relationship to
the federal government is comparable to "that of a ward to his guardian."7
While the precise scope of this federal trusteeship has not been defined,
the federal government has acknowledged its "unique obligation toward
the Indians."'
4. 923 P.2d 1073 (Mont. 1996).
5. Id. at 1085. The Montana Water Use Act is codified at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-2-101 to -
907 (1997). In response to Ciotti, the Montana legislature attempted to do away with the requirement
that an applicant prove that proposed water use would not interfere with Indian reserved water rights
by amending MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-311(1) (1995). Montana Water Use Act, 1997 Mont. Laws,
ch. 497, sec. 7, § 311, 2799-2802. The effect of this amendment is discussed infra, Part III.
6. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
7. Id. at 16-17.
8. Delaware Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 85 (1977). See, generally, FELIX S.
INDIAN WATER RIGHTS IN MONTANA
The unique obligation of the federal government toward the Indians
led the Supreme Court in Winters v. United States to hold that the creation
of Indian reservations by the federal government impliedly reserved water
rights for the benefit of the Indians living on the reservation.9 By creating
water rights by implication, Winters effectively precluded the appropria-
tion of reserved water under state law.' These federally created "Winters
rights" are reserved to allow the tribe to realize the purposes for which
their land was reserved."' Because the rights are reserved as of the date
the reservation was created,"2they are usually senior to most water rights
recognized by state law.
The Supreme Court extended the Winters Doctrine to non-Indian fed-
erally reserved lands in Arizona v. California.3 The Arizona decision
held that establishing Indian reservations creates a concomitant reservation
of water sufficient to develop, preserve, produce or sustain food and other
resources, "to make the reservation livable."14 Inherent in this definition
of Indian reserved water rights is a reservation of water for future use. 5
The ongoing federal policy of promoting tribal self-government16 sug-
gests that tribes should enjoy full authority over Indian reserved water
rights, including the rights of Indian and non- Indian allottees, subject
only to federal regulation. 7 The broad scope of Indian reserved water
rights and the federal nature of Indian policy both suggest that Indian
reserved water rights operate outside the systems of prior appropriation
traditionally utilized by western states.
B. Concurrent State and Federal Jurisdiction? The McCarran Amendment
Most western states adhere to the doctrine of prior appropriation in
establishing water use rights to surface waters." Montana has specifically
COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDLAN LAW 16-17 (Rennard Strickland ed., 1982).
9. 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908).
10. In Winters, the United States sued a non-Indian appropriator of the Milk River on behalf of
the Fort Belknap tribe in Montana. Id. at 565. By holding that the tribe possessed impliedly reserved
water rights as of the date the reservation was created, the Court determined that the Fort Belknap
Tribe's water rights vested in 1888, several years prior to the upstream appropriators' rights. Id. at
577.
11. Id. at 576.
12. Id. at 577.
13. 373 U.S. 546, 599 (1963).
14. Id. at 599-600. The Court has subsequently limited the scope of water rights reserved under
Winters. Water rights reserved by implication are limited to those "necessary to fulfill the purpose of
the reservation, no more." Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 141 (1976).
15. Arizona, 373 U.S. at 600-01.
16. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959). Indian tribes have the right "to make their own
laws and be ruled by them." Id. at 220.
17. COHEN, supra note 8, at 604.
18. Currently, all states west of the 100" Meridian utilize some version of prior appropriation.
19991
134 PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20
adopted the prior appropriation doctrine by statute.'9 The "first in time,
first in right" principle at the heart of the prior appropriation doctrine
encounters several obstacles when applied to reserved water rights. Indian
water rights are impliedly reserved on the date each reservation was creat-
ed. ° Most Indian reservations in the west were established before state
appropriation systems were in place. Thus, Indian reserved water rights
often predate non-Indian use, making tribal rights superior to rights of
non-Indian appropriators recognized under state law.2 '
Furthermore, most prior appropriation schemes have a "use it or lose
it" provision that requires appropriators to put the water to a beneficial use
or risk abandonment of their unused water rights.2 However, Indian re-
served water rights include a reservation of water for future use.23 As
Justice Stevens noted in his dissent in Arizona v. San Carlos Apache
Tribe, "[u]nlike state-law claims based on prior appropriation, Indian re-
served water rights are not based on actual beneficial use and are not
forfeited if they are not used."2 4 The prior and preeminent nature of Indi-
an reserved rights creates a system of recognized water rights that can be
distinguished from those appropriative water rights recognized by the
states and determined in general adjudications. Nevertheless, many states
continue to determine Indian reserved water rights, which are federally
created and contemplate future use, under state systems of appropriation,
which, theoretically, are not equipped to recognize the existence of future
use rights.'
Despite the federal basis of Indian reserved water rights, both federal
and state courts can exercise jurisdiction over matters implicating these
rights. Although the federal government has generally deferred to state
authority in the determination of water rights,26 this policy of deference
does not extend Indian reserved water rights. The McCarran Amendment,
enacted by Congress in 1952, shifted authority to the states by expressly
permitting the joinder of the federal government in state suits involving
the adjudication of water rights.2 7 According to the United States Su-
preme Court, the purpose of the McCarran Amendment was to prevent
GEORGE C. COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 364-66 (3d ed. 1993).
19. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-401(1) (1997).
20. Winters, 207 U.S. at 577.
21. COHEN, supra note 8, at 599.
22. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-404 (1997).
23. Arizona, 373 U.S. at 600-01.
24. 463 U.S. 545, 574 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
25. See Pacheco, supra note 3, at 635-43. The most common procedure is a general stream ad-
judication, which judicially ascertains the inter sese rights of all claimants to a water source. The Mon-
tana adjudication provisions are found at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-2-212 to -243 (1997).
26. See generally California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
27. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1988).
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"piecemeal" adjudications by requiring the determination of all water
rights in a given river system in a single proceeding.s While Congress
did not expressly limit federal protection of Indian reserved water rights in
passing the McCarran Amendment,29 the Amendment permitted state ad-
judications of federally created and recognized water rights.
C. The Colorado River Abstention Test
Federal courts have generally deferred to state determinations of
Indian reserved water rights under the McCarran Amendment. In Colorado
River Water Conservation District v. United States, the Supreme Court
extended the McCarran Amendment's waiver of federal sovereign immuni-
ty to state court adjudications of Indian reserved water rights.3" In Arizo-
na v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, the Court held that the McCarran Amend-
ment negated any limitation placed on state jurisdiction over Indian water
rights by federal policy, including federal enabling acts.3 Furthermore,
the San Carlos Apache Court followed Colorado River by allowing for
comprehensive adjudication of Indian water rights in state courts.32 Cen-
tral to the Court's reasoning was the McCarran Amendment's underlying
policy favoring a single comprehensive adjudication of water rights.33
The critical factor leading the Court to support state adjudication was that
the federal suits in San Carlos Apache were not comprehensive adjudica-
tions. 4 Since San Carlos Apache, lower courts have adhered to Colorado
River and its progeny and continued to allow state adjudications of Indian
reserved rights.35
28. United States v. District Court in and for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520, 525 (1971).
29. Scott B. McElroy & Jeff J. Davis, Revisiting Colorado River Water Conservation District v.
United States - There Must be a Better Way, 27 ARiz. ST. L.J. 597, 601 (1995). McElroy and Davis
argue that subsequent judicial interpretation is the only source for the idea that the prevention of piece-
meal adjudications is the purpose of the Amendment. In their view, the Senators who passed the
Amendment were more concerned with protecting state systems of water law from perceived federal
encroachment. Id. In support of this view McElroy and Davis cite the fact that Indian water rights
were scarcely mentioned during legislative hearings on the proposed bill - Senator McCarran himself
stated that Indian rights would not be affected. Id.
30. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). The Court
noted that "it is clear that a construction of the Amendment excluding those rights from its coverage
would enervate the Amendment's objective." Id. at 811.
31. 463 U.S. at 564.
32. Id. at 570.
33. Id
34. Donald C. McIntyre, Quantification of Indian Reserved Water Rights in Montana: State ex.
rel. Greely in the Footsteps of San Carlos Apache Tribe, 8 PuB. LAND L. REV. 33, 41 (1987).
McIntyre notes that the federal suits in San Carlos Apache Tribe related only to waters bounding or
flowing through the reservation. Id. at 42. The court reasoned that, since only the 9,000 users named
as parties in the federal suits would have been affected by a federal court adjudication, any such feder-
al adjudication would be inconclusive and wasteful. Id.
35. See, e.g., United States v. Oregon Water Resources Dep't, 774 F. Supp. 1568 (D. Or.
1999]
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D. Post Script to Colorado River
In a limited sense, the issue of jurisdiction is not dispositive - state
courts must apply substantive federal Indian law in water rights adjudica-
tions. Thus, the exercise of state jurisdiction is not necessarily an exercise
of state regulatory control that rises to the level of a violation of tribal
rights.36 However, Colorado River's abstention test has inherent short-
comings. One problem with federal abstention is that states generally op-
pose the assertion of Indian reserved water rights, making state court
adjudication of Indian rights undesirable.37 Because the vast majority of
Indian reserved rights remain unquantified, states, as self-interested eco-
nomic actors, maintain a general bias toward the recognition of these
reserved rights.38 The state must compete with Tribes for scarce water
resources in appropriating water for itself and its citizens.39 To allow
state courts to define and preserve Indian water rights in direct opposition
to its own interests makes little sense.4" A related problem is the role of
state agencies in the state court adjudication process. The involvement of
state agencies in the adjudication of water rights is of concern to Tribes
because state agencies are perhaps more biased than state courts.4 In
Montana, for example, the Department of Natural Resources and Conser-
vation (DNRC) is viewed by the Tribes as an adversary whose inclusion
in the adjudication process creates a conflict of interest and violates con-
stitutional due process guarantees.42
Another problem with the Colorado River approach is the lack of
federal review. The U.S. Supreme Court believes that state courts can
provide an equitable setting for the adjudication of Indian water rights.43
However, because federal substantive law must be applied by state courts
in adjudicating Indian water rights, the U.S. Supreme Court has reserved
the right to review state court decisions with "a particularized and exacting
1991).
36. McIntyre, supra note 34, at 47.
37. See Stephen M. Feldman, The Supreme Court's New Sovereign Immunity Doctrine and the
McCarran Amendment: Toward Ending State Adjudication of Indian Water Rights, 18 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REv. 433, 444-45 (1994).
38. Id. at 447-8. (arguing that state courts and state citizens oppose reserved rights out of the
desire for economic certainty). But see McIntyre, supra note 34, at 35 (arguing that Tribes equate
quantification with limitation and therefore favor uncertainty).
39. John A. Folk-Williams, State and Indian Governments: Are New Relationships Regarding
Water Possible?, in INDIAN WATER 1985: COLLECTED ESSAYS 67 (Christine L. Miklas & Stephen J.
Shupe eds., 1986).
40. See Feldman, supra note 37, at 450. (arguing that allowing the state to be both adversary
and adjudicator "seems unfair and counterintuitive.")
41. Id.
42. See McIntyre, supra note 34, at 54.
43. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 812.
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scrutiny commensurate with the powerful federal interest in safeguarding
those rights from state encroachment."'  Despite the Court's assurances
that federal review could cure state court deficiencies,45 several unan-
swered questions remain. No general adjudication of water rights by a
state court has been reviewed by the United States Supreme Court. Fur-
thermore, Justice Stevens' dissent in San Carlos Apache raised serious
questions about the prospect of the United States Supreme Court correct-
ing prejudicial state court decisions." The promise of Supreme Court re-
view, even under a "particularized and exacting scrutiny" standard, of a
state court decision resting upon questionable or incomplete findings of
fact carries little practical weight47 because the Supreme Court is unlikely
to review findings of fact.4"
State court bias and lack of federal review only partially explain the
problem with Colorado River. The most compelling reason for abandoning
the Colorado River approach is that it ignores the special relationship
between the federal government and Indian tribes. The creation of Winters
rights, rights which are federally reserved to meet the special needs of
Indian reservations, seems to carry with it the implicit duty to declare the
nature and scope of those rights. Federal judges who interpret Colorado
River as allowing them to defer completely to state authority over Indian
reserved water rights abandon this duty. Fortunately, not all federal judges
have dropped the ball. Federal district Judge Solomon's two-track ap-
proach in United States v. Adair provides an excellent counter-example.49
E. United States v. Adair--An Alternative
Approach
In Adair, the United States and the Klamath Indian Tribe sued the
state of Oregon in an action for declaration of water rights on the Klamath
Indian Reservation." Judge Solomon gave a broad reading to the 1864
44. San Carlos Apache, 463 U.S. at 571. The Montana Supreme Court supports this standard of
review. State ex rel. Greely v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation,
219 Mont. 76, 95-96, 712 P.2d 754, 766 (1985).
45. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 813.
46. 463 U.S. at 579 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens recognized that Supreme Court
review of state-court water adjudications might undermine the entire adjudication process. "If a state-
court errs in interpreting the Winters doctrine or an Indian treaty, and this Court ultimately finds it
necessary to correct that error, the entire comprehensive state-court water rights decree may require
massive readjustment." Id.
47. Peter Toren, Comment, The Adjudication of Indian Water Rights in State Courts, 19
U.S.F.L. REv. 27, 49 (1984).
48. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) (findings of fact not set aside unless clearly erroneous).
49. 478 F.Supp. 336 (D. Or. 1979), aft'd, 723 F.2d 1394 (91 Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom,
Oregon v. United States, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984).
50. Id. /
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Brunot treaty which created the Klamath reservation, concluding that the
"purposes of the reservation" for which water rights were impliedly re-
served included water necessary to maintain fish and wildlife habitat in the
Klamath Marsh." By interpreting tribal water rights broadly, Solomon
rejected Oregon's argument for a narrow, "primary reservation purpose"
standard.52 The broad scope of Indian reserved rights, according to Solo-
mon, did not limit tribal claims to water for irrigation, but also protected
future rights, including the preservation of hunting and fishing habitat. 3
By limiting its exercise of jurisdiction to a determination of the priority
among reserved water rights arising under federal law, the Adair court was
able to declare the nature and scope of the Klamath Tribe's reserved water
rights while deferring to the state of Oregon's authority to quantify those
rights. Thus, Adair represents an example of a federal court fulfilling its
obligation to protect Indian reserved rights while still satisfying the
McCarran Amendment's policy of avoiding piecemeal water rights adjudi-
cation.
Ill. ENTER CIOTTI
Justice Trieweiler's majority opinion in Ciotti can be interpreted as a
modification of Judge Solomon's 2-track approach. At its core, the Ciotti
decision represents the Montana Supreme Court's recognition of an Adair-
inspired duty to declare the nature and scope of Indian reserved water
rights. As such, Ciotti preserves the federal basis of Indian reserved water
rights in Montana.
A. Factual Background
Between 1984 and 1987, four non-Tribal members owning land in fee
on the Flathead Reservation in Montana filed applications with the DNRC
for new water rights from sources on the Reservation. 4 In response, the
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes filed objections and requested
51. Id. at 345. Compare Id. (interpreting Indian reserved water rights broadly), with In re Gen-
eral Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System, 753 P.2d 76, affd sub
nom. Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989) (rejecting Special Master Roncallio's recom-
mended Indian reserved rights awards, which rights secured instream flows for fish and wildlife, for
scenic and recreational values, for industry, etc.)
52. Adair, 478 F. Supp. at 345. The U.S. Supreme Court adopted the narrow "primary reser-
vation purpose" standard in holding that the creation of the Gila National Forest as a timber reserve
and watershed did not impliedly reserve water rights for such later, secondary purposes of the National
Forest as aesthetic, recreational, wildlife preservation, or stock watering purposes. United States v.
New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 718 (1978).
53. Adair, 478 F. Supp. at 345.
54. Ciotti, 923 P.2d at 1075.
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the applications be denied." The Tribes moved to dismiss, contending
that individual applications could not be granted prior to a determination
of whether the DNRC has jurisdiction over water use rights on the Flat-
head Reservation. 6 The Tribes objections were consolidated and on April
30, 1990 the Director of the DNRC issued an order confirming DNRC
jurisdiction to regulate surplus water on the Reservation.
DNRC's final order confirmed the Director's preliminary finding of
DNRC jurisdiction.58 On May 15, 1992, the Tribes filed a petition for
judicial review in the 1S Judicial District Court in Lewis and Clark County
and a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief in the United States
District Court for the District of Montana.5 9 The state District Court then
stayed any action pending a federal decision. The federal court, however,
ordered the federal action stayed pending state court resolution, while
specifically reserving the federal claims for later review.' On January 12,
1995, the state District Court decided in favor of the DNRC, holding that
the DNRC has jurisdiction pursuant to Montana's Water Use Act to issue
new use permits prior to either a formal adjudication of existing rights or
completion of compact negotiations.6
B. Analysis by the Montana Supreme Court
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court reversed the state District
Court and held in favor of the Tribe. The only issue addressed by the
court was whether the DNRC has authority to grant water permits on the
Flathead Reservation.62 The majority opinion by Justice Trieweiler fo-
cused on the requirements for issuance of water use permits set forth in §
85-2-311.63
55. Il
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. The Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission has the authority to nego-
tiate with the Indian tribes to reach a formal settlement of tribal water rights claims. See MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 85-2-217, 85-2-701 to -708 (1997).
62. Ciotti, 923 P.2d at 1075. The Tribes challenged DNRC's jurisdiction to issue new water use
permits pursuant to MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-311 (1995). Although the Tribes challenge implicates a
number of statutes, this Note focuses its discussion on MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-311 (1995)
(amended 1997). Because the case was bifurcated prior to the DNRC hearing, the Montana Supreme
Court dealt only with the dispositive issue of jurisdiction. Id. at 1076. This allowed the court to forego
analysis of the Tribes' claims that negotiations between the Tribes and the Montana Reserved Water
Rights Compact Commission pursuant to MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-217 suspended DNRC's authority
to issue permits, as well as claims that DNRC was collaterally estopped from disputing the issue of
jurisdiction by an earlier opinion of the same District Court in, United States v. Department of Natural
Resources and Conservation (1P Jud. Dist. Mont. June 15, 1987), No. 50612. 1L
63. The discussion of both the District Court and the Supreme Court mainly concerned MONT.
1999]
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The lower court had limited its analysis to subsections (a) and (b) in
concluding that "the applicant need only show that there is water available
at the proposed point of diversion, and thus not appropriated, giving the
applicant potential, adjudicable water rights to surplus water."'  This
analysis led the lower court to determine that the term "appropriated wa-
ters" within the meaning of the statute excludes Indian reserved water
rights.65 The lower court thereby defined the problem out of existence,
rendering ineffectual the Tribes' argument that an applicant cannot prove
availability until the water supply has been quantified.
The key to the Montana Supreme Court's opinion lies in its distinc-
tion between state appropriative water rights and Indian reserved water
rights. Justice Trieweiler relied heavily on an earlier Montana case in
holding that the DNRC did not have the authority to grant water use per-
mits on the Reservation prior to a formal adjudication of Tribal reserved
rights or the completion of compact negotiations.66 Trieweiler quoted
with approval the following language from Greely:
State appropriative water rights and Indian reserved water rights differ in
origin and definition. State-created water rights are defined and governed
by state law. Indian reserved water rights are created or recognized by
federal treaty, federal statute or executive order and are governed by
federal law.
Appropriative rights are based on actual use. Appropriation for beneficial
use is governed by state law. Reserved water rights are established by
reference to the purposes of the reservation rather than to actual, present
use of the water."
(emphasis added.)
By underscoring the idea that the nature of Indian reserved rights,
which have yet to be quantified, may preclude present use, Justice
Trieweiler found it impossible for an applicant to meet the burden im-
posed by § 85-2-311 (1)(e), namely that the applicant's "proposed use will
CODE. ANN. § 85-2-311 (a), (b), (e) (1995), which subsections establish the criteria an applicant for a
beneficial water use permit must prove by a preponderance of the evidence:
(a) there are unappropriated waters in the source of supply at the proposed point of diversion;
(b) the water rights of a prior appropriator will not be adversely affected;
(e) the proposed use will not interfere unreasonably with other planned uses or developments
for which a permit has been issued or for which water has been reserved ....
64. Ciotti, 923 P.2d at 1076-77. (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-311(1) (1995)).
65. Id. at 1077.
66. Ciotti, 923 P.2d at 1080 (citing State ex rel. Greely v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai
Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 712 P.2d 754 (Mont. 1985)).
67. Greely, 712 P.2d at 762.
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not interfere unreasonably with other planned uses ... for which water
has been reserved."6 The requirement that the proposed use will not in-
terfere with reserved rights "is critical to our conclusion in Greely that the
[Montana Water Use] Act must be applied consistently with federal Indian
law. 69
C. Aftermath of Ciotti
In direct response to the Montana Supreme Court's ruling, the Mon-
tana state legislature amended the Montana Water Use Act in 1997.70 The
unofficial transcript of the legislative committee minutes reveals that the
legislature specifically intended to draft statutory amendments that would
allow the DNRC to circumvent Ciotti.71 The amended version of § 85-2-
311 includes major changes in language and adds several new subsec-
tions.72 The most important changes included amending the language
"unappropriated waters" to water "physically available," the addition of a
new "legal availability" standard, and the striking out of subsection (e),
which formed the basis of Trieweiler's majority opinion. 3 While the
intent of the amendments is clear, their practical impact remains in doubt.
One question to be answered in light of the amended § 85-2-311 is
whether the new language accomplishes the legislature's stated goal of
undermining Ciotti. The meaning of the new "legal availability" standard
is not self-evident and will be subject to judicial interpretation.74 Regard-
less of legislative intent, the logic at the heart of Trieweiler's majority
opinion remains unaffected by the amended version of § 85-2-311. To the
extent that Ciotti adopted the distinction between appropriative and re-
68. Ciotti, 923 P.2d at 1078 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-311(1)(e) (1995)) (citations
omitted).
69. Id. at 1079-80.
70. Montana Water Use Act, 1997 Mont. Laws, ch. 497, see. 7, § 311, 2799-2802.
71. Hearings on S.B. 97 Before the Senate Comm. on Natural Resources, Draft Unofficial Leg-
islative Committee Minutes, 55' Legislature (Mont. 1997) (statement of Senator Mahlum). Senator
Mahlum asked, if the bill were to pass with the proposed amendments, could the Supreme Court
"throw it out like they did the last one?" Id. Legal counsel for DNRC, Don McIntyre, responded that
the intent of the bill was "to put state law in the position that [the Supreme Court] cannot issue the
same decision they did before." Id. (statement of Don McIntyre).
72. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-311 (1997).
73. Montana Water Use Act, 1997 Mont. Laws, ch. 497, sec. 7, § 311, at 2799-2802.
74. The amended version of § 85-2-311 (a)(ii) now reads "water can be considered legally
available.., based on the records of the department and other evidence provided to the department."
MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-311(a)(ii) (1997). In addition, § 85-2-311(1) (a)(ii)(A)-(H) provides a list of
factors to consider in determining the legal availability of water. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-
311(1)(a)(ii)(A)-(H) (1997). Legislative Committee minutes show that members of the Committee on
Natural Resources had reservations concerning the definitions of "legally available" and "physically
available." Hearings on S.B. 97 Before the Senate Comm. on Natural Resources, Draft Unofficial Leg-
islative Committee Minutes, 55' Legislature (Mont. 1997).
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served water rights articulated in Greely, the modification of the statutory
language has minimal effect." The holding in Ciotti seems to preclude
any (not just a properly worded) attempt by the state to appropriate water
use rights prior to a judicial determination of Indian reserved rights or a
termination of compact negotiations.
IV. CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, in most cases the protection of Indian reserved water
rights has not fallen, as McCarran envisioned, on federal courts. Whatever
the reason, federal district court judges do not want to be water masters.
Colorado River's abstention test allows these reluctant judges to defer to
state proceedings under the aegis of insuring comprehensive water rights
adjudication. Ironically, it was the highest state court in Montana that
recognized the Adair-inspired federal duty to protect Indian reserved water
rights with its decision in Ciotti.
The impact of Ciotti has yet to be decided. After granting the Tribes'
Writ of Supervisory Control, the Montana Supreme Court held oral argu-
ments at a rehearing in Helena on January 7, 1999. The amended language
of § 85-2-311 may lead the court to overturn its previous decision, which
would indicate that the decision was based narrowly on Montana statutory
law.76
As it now stands, the Ciotti decision and the Montana legislature's
reactive end-run render the Montana courts and administrative agencies
unable to practically or fairly resolve Indian reserved water rights under
75. The record also reveals a paucity of understanding concerning the difference between re-
served and appropriative water rights, which may cast doubt on the effectiveness of the amendments in
accomplishing the legislature's stated objective of undermining Ciotti. Indicative of this misunder-
standing are the comments of Sen. Grosfield, the sponsor of the amended bill. Grosfield stated that he
considered the bill helpful to the Tribe because the bill does not affect the federal or the tribal re-
served water rights. Grosfield also opined that the amended bill represented the first statutory recogni-
tion that federal reserved rights are existing rights under Montana law. Hearings on S.B. 97 Before the
Senate Comm. on Natural Resources, Draft Unofficial Legislative Committee Minutes, 55' Legislature
(Mont. 1997) (Statement of Senator Grosfield) (emphasis added).
76. This seems unlikely given Justice Leaphart's concurrence. Ciotti, 923 P.2d at 1082.
Leaphart, making the argument the Tribe probably saved for federal court, begins with the idea that
the McCarran Amendment waives tribal sovereign immunity only to allow a general state adjudication
of water rights. Id. The procedure utilized by the DNRC in Montana, which grants new water use
rights on a case-by-case basis, does not constitute a general stream adjudication but comes closer to
agency administration of Tribal reserved rights. Id. at 1085. Leaphart quotes a Ninth Circuit case for
the proposition that a state court cannot adjudicate the administration of water rights until it determines
the extent of those rights, stating:
Because there has been no prior adjudication of relative general stream water rights in this
case, there can be no suit "for the administration of such rights" within the meaning of the
McCarran Amendment.
Id. at 1084 (citing South Delta Water Agency v. United States, 767 F.2d 531, 541 (9' Cir. 1985)).
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the Colorado River abstention test. This legislative-judicial standoff may
hasten the completion of compact negotiations. More likely, the Montana
Supreme Court will uphold Ciotti. Assuming the federal court in Montana
then follows Adair and declares the nature and scope of Indian reserved
water rights on the Flathead Reservation, the quantification of those water
rights could then be "handed-off' to the state of Montana, subject to fed-
eral review. Meanwhile, the Flathead Valley continues to grow.77 As the
economic pressure for a definitive adjudication of water rights on the Flat-
head Reservation increases, so to does the pressure on both the state legis-
lature and the Montana Supreme Court to fashion an equitable solution, a
solution that recognizes the special status of the Confederated Salish and
Kootenai Tribes without bringing the state water appropriations system to
a grinding halt.
77. See Rob Chaney, Population Gains Strong in Ravalli, Flathead, MIssoULIAN, Jan. 24,
1999, at BI (citing data on population growth in Montana collected by the Montana State University
Local Government Center). From 1990 to 1996 the population of Flathead County grew by 19.9% to
70,988. Id.
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